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I. INTRODUCTION 
Firms in which several different actors (or groups of actors)’ jointly 
determine company policy have come into existence in an increasing number 
of countries.2 Yet, with the exception of Steinherr’s (1977) model, the 
existing theories of the firm generally do not reflect the institutional 
framework of a participatory firm. This paper presents two theoretical 
models of such a firm. The approach is quite general and nests the 
established theories of the firm as limiting cases. 
Employee participation in management has been instituted primarily by 
law and in countries with a strong trade union movement.3 For this reason, 
possible influences of different systems of labor relations and trade union 
structures on the behavior of a participatory firm need to be explored. In this 
context it is shown that two different realistic assumptions about the 
objective functions of the relevant actors (or groups of actors) lead to 
strikingly different results in terms of the social efficiency of factor 
allocation. This finding is significant not only for the theory of a 
participatory firm but also for the theoretically limiting cases of a fully 
labor-managed firm or a traditional capitalist firm under collective 
bargaining. 
* I have greatly benefited from discussions with Orley Ashenfelter, Gerald Epstein, Edward 
Green, Arvind Panagariya, Albert Rees, Jaroslav Vanek. and Henry Wan Jr. 1 have also 
received valuable comments from an anonymous referee and an associate editor of this 
journal. Any errors are, of course, my own. 
’ Most frequently these groups are the managers and the representatives of employees and 
shareholders, respectively. 
2 It is impossible to enumerate all the cases, but note that in Western Europe alone, 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have all established 
participatory firms by law. For details, see Schregle (1976) and Windmuller (1977). 
’ In fact, in most Western European countries the unions were instrumental in the 
establishment of a participatory system. Note also that the trade union movement is quite 
influential even in the fully labor-managed economy of Yugoslavia. 
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II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING A PARTICIPATORY FIRM 
In analyzing the behavior of a participatory firm, it is convenient to use as 
a framework the variable-bargaining-power modeL4 which enables one to 
examine an entire spectrum of possible participatory systems. Briefly, the 
model generalizes the Nash (1950, 1953) solution to the two-party 
bargaining game. In the case of two parties, the objective function of the firm 
reflects the joint behavior of the two parties who act as if maximizing 
(J=(J~.U” 
29 (1) 
where U, and U, are the von Neumann-Morgenstern incremental utility 
functions of the two parties, yi and y2 are their relative powers (degrees of 
control over the firm’s policy), y, > 0, y2 > 0, and y, + y2 = 1.j In the case 
where II (n > 2) parties participate in the decision-making the parties act as 
if they maximize: 
with Ui being the von Neumann-Morgenstern incremental utility function of 
party i, yi being its relative power, 0 < yi < 1 for all i, and CyZ i yi = 1. The 
decision-making behavior of the firm can then be perceived as the search for 
a solution along an incremental utility frontier in R2 or R”, respectively. At 
the solution, the elasticity of substitution of Ui for Uj along the incremental 
utility frontier is equal to the relative power of parties i and j (yi/yj). As a 
result, the optimal values of Vi and Uj are proportional to the relative power 
of i and j, adjusted for possible nonlinearity (strict concavity) of the 
incremental utility frontier: 
u* y. au. 6 -L=’ -2 . 
ui* Y j  ( 1 XJ, 
In the usual Western European and, more recently, American system of 
participation by labor, management and shareholders, the three parties can 
be seen to act as if maximizing 
u=pL. QM. u’s ST (4) 
‘See Svejnar (1977, 1980), Kalai (1977), and Roth (1979). 
’ When dealing with relative powers it is convenient to normalize by setting y, + y2 = 1. 
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are incremental in the sense that the threat 
point utility is zero. 
6 If  the utility functions are linear Ur/U,? = y,/yj. 
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where U,, U,, and U, are the respective incremental utility functions of 
labor, management, and shareholders,’ while yL, y,,,, and ys are their 
corresponding degrees of power. Again, 0 < yL, y,+,, ys < 1 and 
yL + yM + ys = 1. While labor, management, and shareholders are the parties 
that most frequently codetermine the company policy in the existing 
participatory schemes, the present framework is quite general and can be 
used to analyze participatory systems which involve additional parties such 
as the representatives of the community in which the firm is located, the 
state, or foreign interests. Similarly, in situations where the management and 
shareholders are thought to have identical objectives (U, = Us), Eq. (4) 
becomes U= WL~ . vY~+~s and the task is reduced to analyzing a two-party 
variable-power game characterized by (1). 
Sections III and IV present two models which are both based on (4) but 
differ in the specification of the utility function, according to which of the 
alternative institutional systems is modelled. In both models the tirm is 
assumed to produce a vector of k outputs Q,,..., Qkr using as inputs labor L, 
managerial input Zt4, capital K, and a vector X,,...,Xn of other inputs. 
Production possibilities are assumed to be strictly convex and the production 
function f(Q, ,..., Q,p L, M, K X, ,..., X,,) < 0 is also assumed to have 
continuous second derivatives. Together these conditions imply that the first- 
order conditions for the maximizations performed in Sections III and IV are 
necessary and sufficient. The results of Section III and IV are discussed in 
Section V. 
III. MODEL I 
In Model I each party is assumed to use its power to maximize the unit 
price of the input it supplies, irrespective of the employment level of that 
input. This scenario corresponds to the objective function of a “pure” labor- 
managed firm as it was used by Ward (1958), Domar (1966), Vanek (1970), 
and others. In particular, in Model I the constituency of the bargainers are 
those workers, managers, and shareholders who remain with the firm once 
equilibrium is reached. As a result, in terms of the objective functions of the 
bargainers, it is only the expected per capita income of these workers, 
managers, and shareholders that counts. The income of others is irrelevant. 
From an institutional standpoint, Model I is especially pertinent for 
analyzing participatory firms where the parties involved are organizations 
which operate only within the firm in question and where the input supply 
’ It is assumed that each party is homogeneous. This appears to be a reasonable 
assumption because intra-group conflicts of interest are likely to be minimized in the 
situations of bargaining with antagonistic groups. 
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decisions within each party are made at the median or top of a clearly 
defined hierarchy. These parties are likely to behave in the spirit of Model I 
since the decision-makers have no external interests and are personally well 
insulated from fluctuations in demand for their input. 
While real-world institutions are always more complex than theoretical 
models, it is worth noting that the British and U.S. industrial relations 
systems, for instance, have important features which are consistent with the 
institutional assumptions of Model I. The trade unions are certified to 
represent employees in a given firm and bargaining is company specific. 
Labor is usually supplied by the union and (re-) hired by the employer on 
the basis of seniority, which in turn leads to the creation of a well defined 
hierarchical structure, The employee with median seniority (median voter) is 
unlikely to be laid off but likely to vote for the union leadership, which 
negotiates the highest wage increases, 
The Western European systems of participation by labor, management, 
and shareholders are also company specific. In a German firm, for instance, 
employee representatives to the board of directors and works council 
represent the interest of employees in the given enterprise.* Since well-defined 
policies exist for hiring, layoffs, and discharges, and since the works council 
codetermines the wage and employment decisions of the company, one could 
argue that Model I applies in this setting as well. However, there are also 
important institutional features which might make Model II of the next 
section more applicable. 
Finally, the Yugoslav labor-managed enterprises, as well as their semi- 
autonomous subunits known as basic organizations of associated labor 
(BOALS), are widely believed to act largely in their own self-interest. While 
this does not necessarily make Model I the appropriate analytical tool, 
virtually all the existing theoretical literature on labor-managed firms 
represents a limiting (one party) case of this model. 
Model I takes the total utility functions of labor U[, management UL, and 




where W, m, and r are, respectively, the average wage,9 managerial salary, 
and rate of return on capital that the firm actually pays. Each group is also 
a It is usually observed that these representatives represent all employees of the firm and 
not just the unionized ones. Here it must be stressed that they represent only employees of the 
firm and not other workers, whether unionized or not. 
9 The term average wage refers to the average income per unit of time that a worker 
receives from the firm. 
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assumed to have some minimum unit price or threat point below which it 
would not supply any of its input to the firm. Denote these prices Wa, ma, 
and P, respectively. They are usually taken to be the input prices that each 
party can obtain in the best alternative (market) employment of its input. 
The corresponding incremental utility functions are 
u,= w- W”, 
U,=m-ma, (6) 
U, = r - ra. 
In accordance with (4), the three parties are seen to act as if maximizing lo 
U = (W - Wa)YL(m - ma)yhf(r - ra)ys (7) 
subject to the constraint that total expenditures equal total revenues: 
Cf=, Pi Qi - WL - mM - rK - CJ’=, ZTXj - rro = 0, where Pi is the price of 
product Qi (i= l,..., k), ZT is the market price of input Xi (j= l,..., n) and 
71~ > 0 is an ex ante determined fixed charge (cost or tax) which goes to 
some party not involved in the bargaining process (e.g., government). 
The term rco plays an important part in the theory of a participatory 
(including labor-managed) firm embedded in Model I. In particular, there are 
values of rco which, when coupled with certain technologies, lead to a nonex- 
istence problem. In fact a maximum exists only in the following cases: (a) 
when no > 0 and the production function f exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale, (b) when rro = 0 and f exhibits constant returns to scale, and (c) when 
7co > 0 and the production function exhibits first increasing and then 
decreasing returns to scale. 
In this paper it is assumed that rro > 0 and that the production set is 
strictly convex (case (a)). The Lagrangean expression for this problem can 
be written in a logarithmic form as 
9 = yL ln( W - W’) + yw ln(m - m’) + ys ln(r - r’) 
+A, Q’ Piei- WL-mM-rK- q’ 
,r, jr, 
Zj”Xj-no 
+ Lf(Q, ,..., Qk, L, M, K X, ,..., X,1, (8) 
” The linear utility functions in (6) implicitly assume risk neutrality. It is clear, however, 
that the relative bargaining powers yL, yM, and yS may be viewed as stemming from 
differential degrees of risk aversion of the three parties within the standard Nash (1950, 1953) 
model. Equations (7) can be viewed as the usual Nash maximand U== U, U,U, where 
(il. = (W - W’)YL, UM = (m - mU)YM, and US = (r - r“)YS. In this case yr,, yu, and yS would 
be parameters of relative risk aversion reflecting the risk attitude of each party relative to 
others. The same interpretation of yL, yM, and yS would not hold, however, if the utility 
functions in (6) reflected risk aversion directly (see Svejnar, 1980). 
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with 1, and A, being the Lagrange multipliers. The first-order conditions lead 
to the following results”: 
aQi n piaL= w= W” + q, i = l,..., k, 
Pig=m=mo+yM;, i = l,..., k, 
i = I,..., k, (11) 
i = I,..., k, 
j = l,..., n, 
(12) 
with 7r=Cf=,PiQi- W”L-mmaM-rr”K-CJ=,Z~Xj-n,. 
Conditions (9)-(12) dictate that all resources ought to be hired so that the 
value of the marginal product of each input with respect to each output 
equals the input price paid by the firm. There is a crucial difference, 
however, between conditions (9~(11) and condition (12). The latter implies 
that inputs Xj (j= l,..., n), whose owners do not participate in decision- 
making, are hired to the point where their values of the marginal product 
equal the market prices Zy (j = l,..., n) of these inputs. In contrast, the 
optimal levels of L, M, and K are given by the equality of the respective 
values of the marginal product and prices W, m, and r, which are determined 
within the firm. Each of these input prices W, m, and r equals its 
corresponding best alternative (market) price W”, ma, and r’, plus a share of 
the net profit rr per unit of input. The profit share is determined by the 
relative power of the party which supplies the input and rc is defined as 
revenues minus costs, with all inputs valued at the market prices. 
Clearly, if zc = 0 there is no room for bargaining and therefore, W = W’, 
m = m”, r = ra and the allocational rule is identical for all the inputs. In this 
case the participatory firm allocates all resources in the same way as a 
traditional profit maximizing firm sharing the same technological and market 
conditions.” As a result, the optimal behavior of a participatory firm is also 
efficient from the society’s point of view when rc = 0. 
” For the sake of simplicity product prices Pi (i = l,..., k) are taken as exogenous. If the 
firm has control over some Pi then the results equate input prices with the marginal reverme 
products rather than values of marginal product. For example, equation (9), would then be 
P,(l + l/~,)@Q,/LX.) = W= w” + y,(n/L) with n, = 8 In Qi/a In P,. 
” This implies that the value of rr,, would be the same for the profit maximizing firm. The 
identity between the two types of firms follows from the fact that both maximize profit. The 
participatory firm in addition, determines how to divide the profit. When II = 0 the 
participatory firm attains the maximum (I at U = 0 in (7) and the profit maximizing firm 
maximizes profit at n = 0. With identical technical and market conditions, the firms then 
behave identically in terms of factor allocation and the scale of operations. 
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The interesting case arises when rr > 0.13 Given yL, yM, ys > 0, the 
participatory firm pays inputs L, M, and K prices W > W”, m > ma, and 
r > P, respectively, while inputs Xj (j = l,..., n) are still paid their respective 
market prices Z; (j= l,..., n). In contrast, a traditional cost minimizing firm, 
producing the same Qi (i = l,..., k) and facing identical technological and 
market conditions, would still pay L, M, and K the market prices Wa, ma, 
and r’l, respectively, and allocate resources accordingly. Similarly, a 
technologically identical profit maximizing firm, while producing different 
levels of Qi (i = I,..., k) at rr > 0, would still allocate resources so that the 
value of the marginal product of each input with respect to each output 
equals the market price of the given input. 
At rr > 0, the optimum of the participatory firm does not coincide with the 
socially optimal factor allocation. Workers, managers, and shareholders, 
who supply their resources elsewhere at Wa, ma, and ra, respectively, would 
find it worthwhile to relocate into the participatory firms (sectors) where W, 
m, and r are paid. It is against the interests of the incumbents in these firms, 
however, to admit the newcomers as full-fledged members of the respective 
parties. l4 Hence, unless the incoming workers, managers, and shareholders 
are able to establish new firms and drive x down to rc = 0 the misallocation 
of resources will persist. 
Unfortunately, in the general case at hand, it is impossible to determine 
unambigously the nature of resource misallocation when 71 > 0. It is likely 
that the participatory firm will use less L, M, and K than the corresponding 
cost minimizing and profit maximizing firms. This claim cannot be 
rigorously substantiated, however, without knowing the degree of 
competitiveness and complementarity among the (k + 3 + n) outputs and 
inputs. Assuming the relative Pis and Zy’s, respectively, are constant, the 
general allocational problem reduces to that of one output Q and four inputs 
L, M, K, and X. In the absence of Hicksian regression between Q and every 
one of the three inputs L, M, and K, the conditions W > Wa, m > ma, and 
r > ra imply that the participatory firm will produce smaller Q than the 
corresponding profit maximizing firm. Since regression is a rare event, this 
outcome is likely. In terms of factor allocation, if X is competitive to L, M, 
and K, then at least one of the L/X, M/X, and K/X ratios will be lower-i5 in 
I3 The case x < 0 is irrelevant because at least one of the parties would not be able to 
obtain the market price for its input. A no-trade situation would result and the firm would go 
out of business. 
” It would be in the incumbents’ interest to hire the resources of these newcomers at IV’, 
m”. and T“ in the same way as they hire the other inputs X, at 2; (j= l..... n). If socially 
feasible, such an arrangement would lead to allocational (though not distributional) results of 
Model II. 
is If L, M, and K are complementary or not highly competitive along themselves, then all 
the L/X. M/X, and K/X ratios will be lower in the participatory firm than in its profit 
maximizing counterpart. See Hicks (1946. pp. 92-98). 
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the participatory firm than in the corresponding profit maximizing firm. In 
order to obtain more definite results, further restrictions can be imposed 
along the lines of separability, the number of parties and/or the number of 
inputs. Three sets of results, obtained along these lines, are reported in the 
Appendix. 
Since the objective function depends on the relative powers yL, yM, and ys , 
it is essential to understand the role that yL, yM, and ys play in Model I. 
Equations (9)-( 11) simplify to r 




r - ra 
=t:aln( ~~r~)=ln(~)+ln(~). (14) 




Equations (15) and (16) indicate that changes in relative powers of the 
parties will result in redistribution of the net profit among the parties in two 
ways. The first redistribution represents an input-constant effect, due purely 
to the. changes in the relative powers. In (15) and (16), with labor’s power 
rising at the expense of the power of management and shareholders, this 
distributional effect equals M/L and K/L, respectively.i6 The last terms on 
the right-hand sides of (15) and (16) represent redistributions of income, 
which the changing yL, yM, and ys bring about through reallocation of L, M, 
and K. The total effect on profit distribution of changing yL, y,,,, and ys can 
I6 The effect in (15) and (16) equals M/L and K/L, respectively, because the transfer is 
denominated in the unit input price of each input. When evaluated in percentage terms it is 
equal to one. 
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thus be decomposed into the input-constant direct effect and the indirect 
effect, which is due to changes in the input ratios. Hence, yL, y,+,, and ys have 
not only distributional but also allocational significance in Model I. 
While the input-constant direct effect is positive and clearly defined, the 
sign of the indirect “input-substitution” effect is not a priori obvious. Model I 
postulates that the parties maximize their respective unit prices, regardless of 
what happens to the employment of their inputs. An increase in the relative 
power of a given party will therefore raise the relative price of its input but it 
may increase or decrease the relative use of the input by the firm. More light 
can be thrown on this issue through the following approach. 
Let W(m, r) = max{ W ( L, M, K, X, PQ(L, M, K, X) - WL - mM - rK 
- Z”X - n, > 0). Since Q is strictly concave in L, M, K, and X, there exist 
L, M, K, X > 0 such that PQ(L, M, K, X) - W(m,r)L - mM - rK - Z”X - 
710 < 0. 
PROPOSITION 1. W(m, r) is decreasing in m and r. 
Proof. Let x* =PQ(L,M,K,X)- W(m,r)L-mM-rK-Z”X-q, > 0. 
For given L, M, K, and X the minimum rr* = 0, which corresponds to 
W(m, r), satisfies 
“* awL-M-O -=-- 
am am - ’ 
an* aw -=--L-K=& 
ar ar 
Rearranging the terms in these two equations yields 
aw 
--M<O, am- L 






PROPOSITION 2. W(m, r) is concave. 
Proof: Let [ W(m, r), m, r, L, M, K, X] and 1 W(m’, r’), m’, r’, L’, M’, 
K’, X’ 1 be two rr* = 0 combinations of input prices and inputs. That is, let 
TK* =PQ(L,M,K,X)- W(m,r)L -mM-rK-ZaX-~O=O, 
7c* = PQ(L’, M’, K’, X’) - W(m’, r’)L’ - m’M’ - r’K’ - ZaX’ - 7~,, = 0. 
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Moreover, let m”=tm+(l-t)m’ and r”=tr+(l-c)r’ with O<t<l. 
Now for some L”, M”, K”, X”, m”, and r” there is W(m”, r”), which 
minimizes 
n* = pQ(L", Ml', K", XJ') - W(m", r/f) L" - m"M" _ r"K" - Z"X" _ x0. 
Since neither m and r nor m’ and r’ necessarily represent the prices of M 
and K that minimize 7c* at L”, M”, K”, and X”, it follows that 
pQ(L II, Mff, K/J, X(J) _ W(m”, r/l) L” - m’fM” - r!‘Kf’ - Z”X” - no 
< PQ(L”, M”, Ku, X”) - W(m, r) L” - mM” - rK” - ZaX” - 7co 
and 
< PQ(L”, M”, K”, X”) - W(m’, r’) L” - m’M” - r’K” - Z”X” - q,. 
As a result, 
pQ(L”, M/r, K”, x/t) _ W(m”, r(t) L/J - m”M” - r”K” _ Z“X” - no 
< PQ(L”, M”, K”, X”) - [tW(m, r) + (1 - t) W(m’, r’)] L” 
- m “M - r “K ” - Z”x” - n 
0, 
which leads to 
W(m”, r”) > tW(m, r) + (1 - t) W(m’, r’). Q.E.D. 
Propositions 1 and 2 provide enough information to show that it is 
unlikely that the sign of the indirect “input-substitution” effect of yL, yIM, and 
ys on the distribution of the net profit can be analytically determined. 
Substituting (17) into (15) and (18) into (16) leads to 
d(y, h) 
E-W +k +wJ 
' ~Ma(?$hY) 
d(y,hs) 
=-W +&. a(-w2) 
= Ys WLlYS)' 
(19) 
(20) 
where W, = aWlam and W, = a W/h-. The first terms on the right-hand side 
of (19) and (20) are positive by Proposition 1. 
To see that the last terms are not a priori determinate, write m = m 
(yL, yM, ys) = m(y,/y,, yL/ys) as m(C,, 62 and r = r(YLT YMM, Ys) = 
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~(YJY~, YJYJ as +L CA with &, = yL/yM and J& = yL/yS. The derivatives 
in the last terms of (19) and (20) then become a[-IY,(m, r)]/a&,, = 
- w, Ih wdx,) - W,,h r>wx,> and a[-w*h 41/x, = 
-lI’zl(m, r)(&rr/&) - W,,(m, r)(ar/&), respectively. Now, while W,, and 
W,, are negative by Proposition 2, the signs of W,, = W,, , am/&,, i?r/a[,,, 
amlay,, and &/a[, cannot be determined in general. Depending on specific 
circumstances, the total effect of a rise in the power of a given party may 
therefore exceed or fall short of the direct effect alone. However, since 
labor’s objective is to increase W- W” and since a[,, a[, represent an 
increase in labor’s power, it is expected that the overall effect in (19) and 
(20) is positive. 
IV. MODEL II 
Model II assumes that the parties involved in bargaining have 
constituencies or interests which transcend the individual firm. In contrast to 
Model I, this model describes a situation where the total quantities of inputs 
supplied (represented) by the bargainers may not be employed in the single 
firm. Each party therefore pursues objectives relating to the income of its 
relatively “large” constituency rather than merely the fraction of its 
constituency employed in a given firm. 
More formally, Model II deals with the situation where there are large 
fixed constituencies of z], K, and a whose expected income is to be 
maximized by their representatives (bargainers) irrespective of the fractions 
of E, Z?, and fi that are employed in the particular firm. An important point 
is that the given constituency of workers 1, for example, need not be the 
entire group of workers in the country, but merely some group larger than 
the workers employed by the firm. 
There are numerous examples of institutions which contain elements that 
fit Model II. In contrast to the Anglo-American trade unions, unions in 
many Western European countries have broad constituencies because of the 
industry, regional and even nation-wide systems of collective bargaining 
between trade union federations and employer organizations. Moreover, in 
many of these countries, a well defined rule such as seniority is not used as 
the sole criterion for lay-offs and rehiring.” Consequently, one can expect 
that there is a strong incentive for Western European trade unions to 
” It is often customary to decrease the number of hours worked by all workers in the 
periods of low demand rather than laying-off workers. The social situation of the workers and 
their families is often among factors considered in determining who is layed-off and who is 
rehired in a given firm. As a result, it is much harder to identify a well-defined hierarchy 
(median voter) in a given firm which would determine the union goals. 
64212112.6 
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maximize the expected wage of all their constituents rather than merely the 
wage of those remaining with a given firm.18 
While the Western European participatory schemes, such as works 
councils and participation on company boards, are primarily company 
specific, it should be noted that trade unions often play a substantial role in 
creating these schemes and exert considerable influence in the selection of 
worker representatives and in the formulation of the economic policies of 
these bodies. The interesting empirical question is whether the unions’ 
influence over these representative bodies is sufficient to propagate the 
broader perspective of Model II or whether the more narrow (company- 
specific) goals of Model I prevail. 
As was pointed out at the start of Section III, the behavior of the Yugoslav 
labor-managed enterprises has been modelled by numerous authors in the 
spirit of Model I. While the highly publicized autonomy enjoyed by the 
Yugoslav firms seemingly supports this classification, it is of interest that in 
his detailed institutional analysis of the Yugoslav system, Vanek (1972) did 
not find support for the “Ward model” in terms of resource allocation.” It 
must also be remembered that the Yugoslav firms operate in an environment 
in which government-sponsored trade unions, various government agencies, 
and regional as well as community organizations exert influence over the 
firms policies. In view of the severe unemployment problem confronting the 
Yugoslav economy, the influence of these parties is likely to reflect the 
features of Model II. Whether the broader perspectives of these parties 
outweigh the presumed self-centered orientation of the workers insulated 
within a given firm is again an empirical issue. 
In accordance with the institutional features described here, Model II is 
formulated so that each party maximizes the expected income of its 
constituents. The total utility functions of labor, management, and 
shareholders may, hence, be defined as 
” As a result of their overwhelming economic and political power, many Western 
European unions also feel at least partially reponsible for their country’s overall economic 
situation which may even transcend their industry- or sector-specific interests. 
I9 The Ward (1958) model of a labor-managed firm was later extended by Domar (1966). 
Jaroslav Vanek (1970), and others. It corresponds to Model I in this paper with y,%, = ys = 0. 
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where Z, &?, and E are the total amounts of labor, managerial input and 
capital supplied by the three parties, and L, M, and K are the levels of these 
inputs that are employed in the given firm at the negotiated prices W, m, and 
r, respectively. By assumption L/z < 1, 1%4/n < 1, and K/K < 1. The 
fractions 1 - (L/L), 1 - (M/M), and 1 - (K/I?) are the proportions of the 
three inputs that are employed at the respective best alternative (market) 
prices Wa, ma and ra.20 Taking, Wa, ma and r* as the threat points, the 
incremental utility functions are 
U,=(W- w$, 
The Lagrangean for this maximization problem may be written in a 
logarithmic form as: 
P’=yL[ln(W- WO)+lnL-ln~;l+y,[ln(m-m”)+lnM-lnM] 
+ YS[ln(r - r’) + In K - In K] 
+A; tT piQi- WL-mM--rK- T’ Zj”Xj--q, 
,Y, ,r, 
+ A;f(Q, ,..., Qk, L, M, K, X, ,..., I,,), 
where Ai and Ai are the Lagrange multipliers. The corresponding first-order 
conditions imply 
p,aei= W” 
1 aL ’ 
i = l,..., k. 
p.!KmQ 
‘a4 ’ 
i = l,..., k, 
p.?%= ra 
‘8K ’ 




*’ Alternatively, one can assume that each party maximizes the income bill that it can 
generate with the input it supplies. The total utility function are then Cry = WL + (z - L) cI/‘. 
UL = mM + (fi - M) m’, and Ug = rK + (K - K) r’. With W’z, m”M, and r”i? being the 
resistance points, the incremental utility functions become U, = ( W - W“)L. 
U, = (m - m’)M and US = (r - r’)K. The results of this approach are identical with those of 
Model II in the main text. 
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where 7c = Cr=, Pi Qi - WaL - maM - r”K - x7= 1 ZyXj - rt,, as in Model I. 
Equations (25)-(27) give expressions for W, m, and r that are identical with 
those in Mode1 I (Eqs. (9)-(11)). Each party secures an input price which is 
equal to the best alternative (market) price plus a share in the net profit rr 
per unit of input employed. The share is again determined by the relative 
power of the given party. It is also evident, however, that while the 
expressions for W, m, and r coincide in the two models, actual W, m, and r 
may differ because L, A4, and K are determined by different allocational rules 
in the two models.” Equations (21)-(24) imply that in Model II all 
resources are hired so that the marginal value product of each input with 
respect to each output is equated to the best alternative (market) price of that 
input. Thus rule applies to all inputs, irrespective of whether their owners 
codetermine the company policy or not. 
Therefore, in contrast to Model I, decisions concerning optima1 resource 
allocation are separate from input price determination in Model II. In fact, 
the decision-making process of Mode1 II may be thought of as proceeding in 
two stages. First, resources are allocated according to (21k(24). The 
resulting optimal values of L, M, K, Xj (j = l,..., n) and Qi (i = l,..., k), 
together with the parametrically given values of Wa, ma, r“, Zy (j = l,..., n) 
and Pi (i = l,..., k), determine the net profit 7~. If rc > 0, then in the second 
stage of decision-making the parties involved distribute rr among themselves 
in proportion to their relative powers. 
Unlike Mode1 I, the relative powers yL, yw, and yS have no allocational 
role in Mode1 II. They merely determine the distribution of the net profit, 
when rc > 0. Rearrange (25~(27) as 
W-W” y,M =---- 
m-ma yM L’ 
W-V y,K =-- 
r - ra Ys L . 
(28) 
(29) 
” In particular, the partial derivatives in (2 l)-(24) are evaluated at different points than in 
(9~(12) when n > 0. 
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Equations (28) and (29) look identical with (13) and (16) of Model I. 
However, there is a major distinction between the two sets of conditions and 
it lies in the fact that L, M, and K are determined independently of yL, yu, 
and yS in Model II. Consequently, any variation in the relative powers will 
be reflected directly in the relative incremental incomes of the three parties. 
No indirect “input-substitution” effect exists in Model II. The direct effect is 
the total effect 
Finally, it is worth noting that while the term rcO has been included in the 
analysis, it plays no crucial part in Model II. A maximum exists so long as 
the production function does not exhibit increasing returns to scale 
throughout. 
V. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The foregoing analysis provides several important results: 
(1) When the net profit rt is zero, participatory firms described in the 
two models behave identically, provided they share the same technology and 
market conditions. In this case the two firms are also indistinguishable from 
a traditional profit maximizing firm, which faces the same technological and 
market constraints. All three types of firms allocate resources efficiently. 
(2) The interesting case arises when 71 > 0. The participatory firm of 
Model II still behaves identically with the corresponding profit maximizing 
firm in terms of factor allocation and output supply. The only difference 
between them lies in the distribution of the net profit TL The participatory 
firm of Model I follows a different allocational rule, however, and while 
maximizing its objective function, it allocates resources inefficiently from the 
social point of view. 
(3) The role of relative powers yL, yM, and yS which the parties have 
over the firm’s policy differs in the two models. While in Model II the 
relative powers influence only the distribution of rc, in Model I they have 
allocational significance as well. 
(4) In Model I the ex ante determined term x0 (fixed cost or a lump sum 
tax) plays a crucial part in that some values of r-c,, when coupled with 
328 JAN SVEJNAR 
certain technologies, lead to a non-existence problem. Mode1 II generates no 
such problems. It merely requires non-increasing returns to scale for a 
maximum to exist. 
The different conclusions that can be derived from the two models 
naturally raise the empirical question as to whether given institutions give 
rise to participatory firms of Mode1 I or Mode1 II. Since the two models 
were intentionally formulated so as to represent two polar cases of 
socioeconomic behavior, various hybrid and possibly more realistic cases 
could be envisioned, with some parties acting in the spirit of Model I and 
other of Mode1 II. The existing literature on participatory and labor- 
managed firms employed models which are in the class of Mode1 I. As a 
result, the inefficiencies associated with this mode1 have become virtually 
synonymous with the presumed behavior of participatory and labor-managed 
firms. Various authors, including Ireland and Law (1978) have developed 
artificial schemes for correcting the perceived misallocation of resources in 
labor-managed firms and economies. Yet, as the institutional introductions to 
Models I and II indicate, there is enough casual empirical evidence to 
suggest that at least some of the existing institutional systems may contain 
participatory firms behaving according to Mode1 II. Hence, while corrective 
schemes may be useful as policy tools vis ~2 vis the participatory firms of 
Mode1 I, it is first necessary to determine empirically whether the relevant 
institutions indeed foster the behavior implicit in that model. 
Since (a) the two models present testable hypothesis and (b) very little 
empirical work has been done in this area, the next important step would 
clearly be to test the allocational and distributional effects of yL , yM, and ys . 
Using equations corresponding to (9) and (25) of this paper, Svejnar 
(1977, 1981) found positive wage effect associated with the introduction of 
certain forms of German codetermination. These empirical results are 
compatible with both Model I and II. In order to distinguish between the two 
models empirically, tests need to be formulated in terms of Eqs. (15t( 16) 
and (3Ok(3 1). 
APPENDIX 
In order to derive more specific results about the behavior of a Model I 
participatory firm when 7~ > 0, restrictions need to be imposed either in terms 
of separability of the production function, the number of parties and/or the 
number of inputs. This appendix presents the results of three different sets of 
assumptions: 
(a) Only labor and shareholders participate in decision-making and L 
and K are the only inputs. In this case the production function is 
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Q = Q(L, K). The first-order conditions are P(aQ/aL) = W > W” and 
P(i?Q/aK) = r > ra at 7c > 0, as compared to P(aQ/aL) = W” and 
P(aQ/aK) = ra at 7c = 0. Hence, at rc > 0 both L and K command higher 
prices than they would receive in the corresponding profit maximizing firm. 
In the absence of Hicksian regression between Q and both L and K, this 
means that the participatory firm will operate at a lower level of output than 
its profit maximizing counterpart. For a homothetic production function it is 
also true that the K/L ratio will be higher (lower) in the participatory firm 
than in the profit maximizing firm if W/r > Wa/ra (W/r < Wa/r”). If the 
comparison is made between a participatory and a corresponding cost 
minimizing firm, then this condition holds even for a non-homothetic 
production function. As far as the absolute levels of L and K are concerned, 
the participatory firm will use less of both L and K than its profit 
maximizing counterpart, unless (i) W and r constitute very uneven increases 
from W” and r’, and (ii) high competitiveness exists between L and K. If (i) 
and (ii) hold, then the factor, whose price rises relatively less, might actually 
be used more than at W” and r”; Hicks (1964, pp. 92-98). 
(b) Labor, managers, and shareholders participate in decision-making 
(y,, y,,,, ys > 0), L, M, K, and X are used in production of Q, and the 
production function is additively separable in all its inputs-Q = c(L) + 
d(M) + e(K) + f(X). Since P(aQ/aL) = PC’(L) = W > W”, P(aQ,@M) = 
P&(M) = m > ma, P(aQ/aK) = Pe’(K) = r > P, and P(aQ/aX)= 
Pf’(X) = Z” at x > 0, it follows that the participatory firm will use less L, 
M, and K, and produce smaller Q then the profit maximizing firm. Input X 
will be used identically in both firms. 
(c) Managers do not participate in decision-making (y,+, = 0), L, M, K, 
and X are used in production of Q, and the production function is pairwise 
additively separable as follows: Q =f(L, K) + g(M,X). It this case, 
P(agaL) =f,(L,K)= W> Wa, P(aQ/aK)=f,(L,K)= r > ra, P(aQ/aiv)= 
g,(M, X) = ma, and P(aQ/aX) = g,(M, x) = Z" at rr > 0. The levels of L, K, 
and Q are determined by the same rules as in (a) above. In the absence of a 
regression between Q and both L and K, the participatory firm will operate 
at a lower Q than the profit maximizing firm when r> 0. If f (L, K) is 
homothetic, then the K/L ratio will be higher (lower) in the participatory 
firm than in the profit maximizing one as long as W/r > 
Wa/ra( W/r < W”/r”). Finally, the participatory firm will use less L and K 
than its profit maximizing counterpart unless conditions (i) and (ii) of (a) 
prevail. Since g(M, X) is independent off (L, K) and g,,,(h4, x) = ma and 
g,(M, X) = Z”, it follows that the utilization of M and X will be identical in 
both firms. 
The three examples in this appendix demonstrate that definite results can 
be obtained for specific situations. Numerous other outcomes could, of 
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course, be generated analogously from different technical and behavioral 
assumptions. 
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